Stakeholder Mapping, Influence Networks and Decision Authorities

The present crisis represents a mature multi‑domain system wherein the Iranian state—specifically the institutional complex of the Supreme Leader's office and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force—functions as the nexus for kinetic, maritime, cyber, and financial‑sanctions actions [^7],[21],[^44],[16],[^36],[55],[^72],[56],[^47]. This system is characterized by a bifurcation of formal and operational authority. The Supreme Leader and IRGC command constitute the proximate decision‑making nodes for military strikes and strategic closures, while presidential rhetoric serves a public‑diplomatic function rather than an operational control vector [^44],[16],[^40],[32],[^35]. This institutional arrangement, when combined with the opacity inherent to cyber and information operations and the ambiguous external postures of Russia and China, generates a high‑velocity environment. Within this environment, political signals, proxy actions, and market reactions interact over a compressed timeframe of hours to days, rather than weeks or months [^67],[49],[^50],[51],[^19],[28],[^60],[27],[^34]. The crisis is thus defined not by individual actors, but by the structured interplay of competing institutional rationales: the revolutionary‑charismatic authority of the IRGC seeking routinization, the traditional authority of the Supreme Leader's office, and the legal‑rational authority of international bodies and commercial gatekeepers.

Stakeholder Analysis: Objectives, Capacities, and Influence Channels

State Actors & Core Institutional Complexes

• Iran (Supreme Leader & IRGC/Quds Force):

  • Objective: Preservation of the revolutionary state's sovereignty and regional influence while navigating economic pressure. This manifests as a calculated escalation designed to signal resolve and extract concessions without triggering a full‑scale conflict that would jeopardize the regime's institutional survivability [^44],[16],[^32].
  • Capacity/Resources: Command over conventional and asymmetric military assets (navy, missiles, cyber units), direct operational control of the Quds Force, and orchestration of a regional proxy network. This provides a potent force‑multiplier and deniability [^16],[36],[^14].
  • Primary Influence Channels: Kinetic military action, maritime denial operations (mines, USVs, small‑boat swarms), proxy tasking, and strategic communication through IRGC‑affiliated media [^57],[40],[^54],[87].

• United States (Executive & Bureaucratic Apparatus):

  • Objective: Deterrence of regional aggression, protection of freedom of navigation and ally security, and enforcement of the sanctions regime to constrain Iranian capabilities [^42],[43],[^26],[74].
  • Capacity/Resources: Overwhelming conventional military power (CENTCOM), global financial hegemony (Treasury/OFAC), and diplomatic weight [^46],[22],[^22],[29],[^73].
  • Primary Influence Channels: Military strikes and posture deployments, sanctions designations and licensing, intelligence sharing, and multilateral coalition‑building [^13],[74].

Proxies & Non‑State Armed Actors

• Hezbollah, Houthis (Ansar Allah), Iraqi Militias (PMF):
  • Objective: Varies by group but generally aligned with Iranian strategic interests; local autonomy allows for pursuit of parochial goals (e.g., Houthi control of Yemen, PMF influence in Iraq) which can, in turn, regionalize a conflict [^36],[14],[^41],[2].
  • Capacity/Resources: Significant local military and guerrilla capabilities, including drones, missiles, and maritime attack assets. They provide Iran with deniable, rapid‑response vectors [^5],[32],[^33],[37].
  • Primary Influence Channels: Direct attacks on shipping, energy infrastructure, and military targets; shaping the regional information environment [^57],[62].

Private‑Sector Gatekeepers (De‑facto Operational Authorities)

• Global Carriers (e.g., Maersk), P&I Clubs, War‑Risk Insurers, Cloud Providers:
  • Objective: Commercial viability and risk management. These entities seek to minimize exposure to physical, financial, and cyber risks [^56],[48],[^53].
  • Capacity/Resources: Control over global shipping logistics, underwriting capacity, and digital infrastructure. Their decisions can render transit routes economically untenable independent of state action [^20],[61],[^58].
  • Primary Influence Channels: Booking suspensions, rerouting orders, withdrawal of insurance coverage, and security advisories that immediately re‑price risk and alter commercial behavior [^53],[52],[^1].

Multilateral & International Bodies

• International Energy Agency (IEA), United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
  • Objective: Market stabilization (IEA), conflict de‑escalation and diplomatic coordination (UN), and technical monitoring (IAEA) [^47],[27],[^34].
  • Capacity/Resources: Strategic petroleum reserves (SPR), diplomatic platforms, and technical inspection mandates. However, their effectiveness is constrained by delivery lags, cavern throughput limits, and political fissures within member states [^4],[24],[^63],[64],[^65],[70],[^77],[83],[^89],[81],[^84],[91],[^81],[92],[^79],[80],[^81],[86],[^88],[90],[^93],[94].
  • Primary Influence Channels: Coordinated SPR releases, Security Council resolutions and debates, and technical reporting that establishes verified facts on the ground [^76],[80],[^88],[92],[^78],[81].

External Influencer States

• Russia:

  • Objective: Weaken Western geopolitical cohesion and benefit from sustained higher hydrocarbon prices. Support for Iran serves as a low‑cost method of diverting U.S. resources and challenging the U.S.-led order [^19],[28],[^71],[12].
  • Capacity/Resources: Potential provision of materiel, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic cover in multilateral forums. The depth of operational support remains ambiguous and contested in open sources, representing a binary risk amplifier [^60],[60],[^6].
  • Primary Influence Channels: UN Security Council veto, arms and technology transfers, and strategic messaging [^18],[23],[^45].

• China:

  • Objective: Ensure stable energy supplies while expanding strategic influence and protecting its commercial and financial systems from secondary sanctions [^68],[68],[^85].
  • Capacity/Resources: Massive purchasing power over Iranian energy exports, diplomatic leverage as a Permanent UNSC member, and the ability to provide alternative financial channels [^59],[15],[^82].
  • Primary Influence Channels: Buyer decisions that blunt sanctions efficacy, diplomatic mediation offers, and potential administrative instructions to financial institutions [^82],[69],[^96].

Influence Network Map: Relationships and Structural Flows

The influence network is hierarchically structured yet operationally diffuse. Formal authority flows from the Iranian Supreme Leader through the IRGC General Command to the Quds Force [^16],[40]. The Quds Force, in turn, maintains command‑and‑influence relationships with regional proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias). However, these relationships are not purely patrimonial; they involve varying degrees of local autonomy, allowing proxies to act as semi‑independent escalation vectors that can regionalize an incident and complicate state‑to‑state de‑escalation [^36],[14],[^41],[2].

This kinetic network intersects decisively with the global commercial and financial system. Actions by state and proxy actors trigger immediate reactions from private‑sector gatekeepers—insurers, carriers, cloud providers—whose risk‑management decisions create de‑facto chokepoints. The threat of maritime interdiction, for instance, becomes materially equivalent to physical closure once war‑risk premiums surge and carriers suspend bookings [^56],[48],[^53],[57]. This creates a powerful feedback loop: asymmetric tactics (mines, USVs, cyber attacks) produce outsized economic effects, which then influence the political calculations of state actors [^55],[62],[^95].

Externally, Russia and China occupy pivotal but structurally distinct positions. Russia functions as a potential force‑multiplier and systemic beneficiary, while China acts primarily as a commercial and diplomatic buffer. Their engagement—or lack thereof—materially alters the persistence and geographic diffusion probabilities of the crisis. Daily monitoring of their diplomatic contacts, UN voting patterns, and transfer reporting is therefore essential [^19],[28],[^60],[27],[^34],[34].

Decision Authority Matrix: Institutional Signatories for Critical Actions

This matrix elucidates the routinization of authority. Within Iran, the formal constitutional structure is superseded by the revolutionary‑institutional authority of the IRGC complex for operational matters. In the United States, authority follows the legal‑rational bureaucracy of the executive branch, with specialized agencies (Treasury/OFAC, DoD) wielding delegated power. The inclusion of private‑sector actors underscores a critical modern reality: commercial rationalization creates autonomous centers of decision‑making power that can enact outcomes functionally equivalent to state decrees.

Alignment Assessment: Conflict and Cooperation Dynamics

The strategic landscape is fundamentally bifurcated, creating predictable institutional friction. On one side exists a coalition oriented around deterrence and sanctions enforcement: the United States, key European Union states, and Gulf Cooperation Council partners. Their instruments—military posture, financial sanctions, and diplomatic isolation—are designed to impose costs and contain Iranian actions [^10],[11],[^19],[25],[^30],[38],[^74],[13].

On the opposing side are networks oriented around mitigating or evading those same pressures: buyer‑states (notably China), alternative‑commerce vectors (shadow fleets, crypto payments), and diplomatic mediators (Oman, Qatar, Switzerland) [^59],[27],[^34],[34]. This structural opposition generates chronic tension at specific bureaucratic choke points: the granting of sanctions waivers, the issuance of specific licenses by OFAC, and the coherence of cross‑jurisdictional enforcement against shadow‑finance mechanisms [^22],[22],[^29],[73],[^8].

The proxy network aligned with Iran introduces a layer of nonlinearity. While broadly aligned with Tehran's strategic interests, the local objectives and command autonomy of groups like the Houthis or Iraqi militias can lead to actions that outpace or complicate central Iranian escalation calculus, acting as independent inflators of kinetic risk [^36],[14],[^5]. Conversely, the historical back‑channels maintained by Oman, Qatar, and Switzerland, alongside credible technical channels like the IAEA, represent the institutional infrastructure with the highest potential for brokering short‑term de‑confliction or transactional deals [^3],[42],[^17],[31].

The posture of Russia and China determines whether this bifurcation hardens into a entrenched standoff or remains malleable. Movement by either from rhetorical support to material sustainment (Russia) or from buyer‑state passivity to active sanctions‑easing (China) would sharply increase scenario persistence and diffusion probabilities [^19],[28],[^60],[68],[^68].

Actionable Takeaways: Implications for Institutional Monitoring and Response

Prioritize IRGC Operational Signals Over Diplomatic Rhetoric. For early‑warning and escalation assessment, monitoring must focus on the institutional actors wielding operational authority. IRGC and Quds Force communications, force dispositions, and proxy attack metrics constitute higher‑probability tripwires for military action or Strait interdiction than statements from the Iranian presidency or foreign ministry [^16],[39],[^40],[32],[^35]. Analysis should treat the latter as elements of public diplomacy within the state's internal division of labor, not as reliable control vectors.

Integrate Private‑Sector Gatekeepers as Primary Risk Nodes. Risk models must account for the autonomous decision‑making power of commercial entities. The advisory notices from major container lines (e.g., Maersk), premium adjustments by war‑risk insurers in the Lloyd's market, and security directives from cloud providers can trigger de‑facto closures and immediate economic shocks. These should be monitored with the same rigor as governmental pronouncements [^56],[48],[^53],[20],[^61],[58].

Treat Russia/China Posture as a Daily Watchlist Binary. The crisis's trajectory is heavily conditioned by whether these external influencers remain rhetorically supportive or transition to material enablers. Intelligence collection and diplomatic reporting should daily scrutinize UN voting, arms‑transfer indicators, and high‑level contact patterns for evidence of this shift, which would fundamentally alter persistence calculations [^19],[28],[^60],[27],[^34],[34],[^68],[85].

Require Multi‑Source Verification to Filter High‑Noise Signals. The operational environment is saturated with contested attributions—in cyber attacks, disputed leadership‑strike claims, and unconfirmed policy leaks. Basing decisions on single‑source or social‑media‑driven information carries high mispricing risk. Corroboration through vendor security notices, official government advisories (OFAC, IEA), or insurer bulletins is essential before recalibrating exposure [^67],[49],[^50],[51],[^66],[47],[^22],[62].

Identify Mediation Through Historical Bureaucratic Channels. De‑escalation pathways are not created ad hoc but run through existing institutional conduits. The established back‑channel roles of Oman, Qatar, and Switzerland, and the technical‑reporting mechanisms of the IAEA, represent the most viable infrastructure for brokering short‑term de‑confliction. Efforts should be directed toward reinforcing and utilizing these extant channels rather than seeking novel diplomatic configurations [^27],[34],[^3],[42],[^17].

Sources

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2. Fraying loyalist base will challenge Iran's next leader as Islamic Republic's legitimacy recedes - 2026-03-08
3. Brent Crude Tops US$100 Amid Strait Of Hormuz Tensions #BrentCrude #OilPrices #Geopolitics #StraitOf... - 2026-03-13
4. 🚨 Oil is charging toward $100/barrel as the Strait of Hormuz essentially shuts down. Even a historic... - 2026-03-12
5. Iran’s regional proxy groups—including Hezbollah, Popular Mobilization Forces, Ansarallah, and Hamas... - 2026-03-12
6. 🚨 BREAKING: 🇪🇺 EU Council President states that Russia is the 'only winner' from the war on Iran. #... - 2026-03-11
7. UAE refinery closure signals deepening crisis from US-Israel joint strikes on Iran. Aramco warns of ... - 2026-03-11
8. "Treasury Sanctions Facilitators of DPRK IT Worker Fraud Targeting U.S. Businesses" published by UST... - 2026-03-12
9. 🚨 WSJ reports DOJ probe involving Binance The U.S. Department of Justice is investigating whether I... - 2026-03-11
10. #Russia is providing #Iran with #Targeting information on location of #USSoldiers & #US ships, artil... - 2026-03-11
11. Iran’s underground ‘missile cities’ have become one of its biggest vulnerabilities #Iran #Tehran #Ir... - 2026-03-06
12. Lavrov: Russia will do everything possible to make a US–Israel operation against Iran “impossible”. ... - 2026-03-06
13. US grants 30-day waiver for India to buy Russian oil yespunjab.com?p=224734 #TrumpAdministration #... - 2026-03-06
14. Breaking News: Strikes escalate across the Middle East as Iran attacks US Embassy in Saudi Arabia #I... - 2026-03-03
15. Iran war has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a vital oil chokepoint. Reopening it is a big challenge - 2026-03-11
16. 📺 Explosion rocks Tehran during Quds Day rally https://www.nbcnews.com/video/shorts/explosion-rocks... - 2026-03-13
17. 🚨 U.S. 'misadventure' in Iran has no clear exit strategy, Russia's UK ambassador says https://www.c... - 2026-03-13
18. 👇🇺🇸🇷🇺"US temporarily eases Russia oil sanctions as Iran war pushes up energy prices" #RussiaSanction... - 2026-03-13
19. Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei in Coma After US-Israeli Air Strike - Seeking Treatment at Tehran Hospita... - 2026-03-12
20. Trump Announces Potential US Naval Escorts and Financial Guarantees to Resume Shipping Through the S... - 2026-03-06
21. LIVE UPDATES: “The U.S. and Israel have pummelled Iran with strikes throughout the country, as Iran ... - 2026-03-05
22. 🇮🇷 🚀➕🚁 💥⬇️ 📍✈️ 🇦🇿 #Azerbaijan #IranConflict [Link] Iran missiles and drones fall near Nakhchivan ai... - 2026-03-05
23. 🕙 09:59 | RTL Nieuws 🔸 #Olie #Rusland #Conflict #Oorlog #MiddenOosten [Link] Rusland spekkoper door... - 2026-03-13
24. The International Energy Agency agrees to release 400 million barrels of oil, the largest such move ... - 2026-03-11
25. The U.S. and Israel have discussed sending special forces into Iran to secure its stockpile of highl... - 2026-03-09
26. 🚨 JUST IN: 🇺🇸🇮🇷 US military says it has now sunk 43 Iranian Navy ships . #US #Iran #USNavy #CENTCOM... - 2026-03-07
27. Three US MQ-9 Reaper drones have been downed, CBS reports . #USA #MQ9 #Reaper #Drones #Downed #CBS ... - 2026-03-06
28. JUST IN: 🇮🇱🇮🇷 Sirens sounding in Jerusalem and central Israel as Iran launches new wave of missiles.... - 2026-03-04
29. 🚨 JUST IN: The US military announces it has destroyed 17 Iranian naval vessels, including a submarin... - 2026-03-04
30. The US president says Iran's navy, air force and air detection systems have been "knocked out", as I... - 2026-03-03
31. 🚨 🇺🇸 US embassy in Riyadh hit by drones; fire reported amid ongoing Israel‑Iran strikes. 💥 Explosion... - 2026-03-03
32. The impact hit the port side of the engine compartment which was set on fire. Twenty crew were resc... - 2026-03-11
33. 🇮🇷𝗛𝗲𝗮𝗱 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗦𝗻𝗮𝗸𝗲 Two nights ago in the Hafeziyeh district of Arak, IRGC Aerospace commander Esma... - 2026-03-11
34. EXTREME – 90/100. US sub torpedoed Iranian frigate, igniting direct kinetic clash between nuclear po... - 2026-03-09
35. ‼️🇮🇷𝗕𝗥𝗘𝗔𝗞𝗜𝗡𝗚: 𝗜𝗥𝗚𝗖 𝗔𝗽𝗽𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗹𝘆 𝗚𝗼𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗥𝗼𝗴𝘂𝗲 𝗔𝗺𝗶𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗱𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗽 𝗖𝗿𝗶𝘀𝗶𝘀 #OSINT #Iran #GulfSecurity #M... - 2026-03-08
36. Iranian missiles and drones slammed the UAE, prompting a resilience pledge, as Israel ramps up warni... - 2026-03-07
37. 🔴IRAN: US airstrike impacts and sinks Iranian IRGC Navy corvette IRIS Shahid Sayyad Shirazi, off the... - 2026-03-05
38. 🔴IRAN-ISRAEL: Explosions over Tel Aviv as Iranian ballistic missiles are intercepted. No impacts. A... - 2026-03-05
39. 🇮🇷 US Second Phase Strikes on Iran Have Begun According to WarMonitor, second phase of US strikes o... - 2026-03-07
40. 🇺🇸🇮🇷 JUST IN: US bombs Iranian drone carrier ship. Major escalation as Washington strikes Tehran's ... - 2026-03-06
41. #Yemen 's #Iran-backed #Houthi leader said in a televised speech his group was ready to #strike at a... - 2026-03-05
42. A U.S. submarine sank Iran’s frigate IRIS Dena, killing 87 sailors. Iran calls it an “atrocity at se... - 2026-03-05
43. 🚨 JUST IN: 🇮🇷 Iran threatens to strike Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor if the US and Israel attempt ... - 2026-03-05
44. 🚨 JUST IN: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian apologizes for attacking neighbors—pledges to stop un... - 2026-03-07
45. The price of Russian crude rose above the level assumed in the country’s federal budget for the firs... - 2026-03-12
46. Cargo ship hit in Strait of #Hormuz forcing crew to evacuate #USIranWar #IranWar‌ #OilMarkets #Iran... - 2026-03-11
47. AIE libera 400 millones de barriles de reserva estratégica #Petroleo #AIE #ReservasEstrategicas ... - 2026-03-11
48. Tráfico en Ormuz se hunde y llega menos petróleo al mundo #Ormuz #EstrechoDeOrmuz #COSCO #Petrole... - 2026-03-04
49. Stryker hit by major cyberattack; Iranian-linked group Handala claims responsibility. Global operati... - 2026-03-12
50. Iran-linked Handala group claims wiper attack on medical tech firm Stryker, impacting operations in ... - 2026-03-12
51. MedTech Giant Stryker Crippled by Iran-Linked Hacker Attack Stryker was targeted by the Handala grou... - 2026-03-11
52. Iran’s March 2–3 drone strikes hit AWS data centers in UAE & Bahrain, disrupting cloud services and ... - 2026-03-07
53. London marine insurers widen high-risk zone in Mideast as Gulf conflict escalates - 2026-03-03
54. Iranian Strikes on Amazon Data Centers Highlight Industry’s Vulnerability to Physical Disasters Two ... - 2026-03-03
55. ❗️The announcement by the US Secretary of Energy that the US Navy would escort ships through the Str... - 2026-03-11
56. Maersk suspends FM1 (Far East–ME) & ME11 (ME–EU) amid Iran/Mideast risk-off; carriers reroute/halt G... - 2026-03-06
57. Everything wrong with capitalism and the U.S. The Marshall Islands nation, known for 67 US nuclear ... - 2026-03-04
58. 🚢 📍🌊 🇮🇷⚔️ ➡️ 🗣️🇨🇳 ✨🛡️🚫💥 #MaritimeSecurity #StraitOfHormuz [Link] Ships identify themselves as Chine... - 2026-03-13
59. #China in talks with #Iran to allow safe #oil & #gas passage through #StraitOfHormuz sources The #w... - 2026-03-05
60. Isolated and under fire, Iran strikes out as Russia and China stand aside - 2026-03-05
61. Insurance companies closed Ormuz #oil #Russia Oil tankers are forbidden by insurance companies to c... - 2026-03-10
62. @aramco said that there would be "catastrophic consequences" for the world's oil markets if the Iran... - 2026-03-11
63. Oil rebounding toward $90+ despite IEA's massive 400M barrel reserve release — markets doubt it'll o... - 2026-03-11
64. IEA coordinates record 400M barrel oil release from strategic reserves. 32 countries join largest-ev... - 2026-03-11
65. International Energy Agency agrees to release 400 million barrels of oil from emergency reserves to ... - 2026-03-11
66. A recent Reuters dispatch details that hackers linked to Iran launched an attack on US medical devic... - 2026-03-11
67. CRITICAL: March 2026 sees Stryker Corp hit by suspected Iran-linked Handala hackers, crippling digit... - 2026-03-11
68. As uncertainty continues to strike global energy markets, #China's answer is becoming clearer. The G... - 2026-03-12
69. BEIJING, March 2025 — China has issued an immediate and comprehensive ban on fuel exports for March,... - 2026-03-12
70. Wall Street closes lower as oil surges 5% amid Iran conflict closing Strait of Hormuz. IEA releases ... - 2026-03-12
71. Oil blasts past $100 — Brent +8% to $100, WTI +9% near $96 — as Iran's new leader says Strait of Hor... - 2026-03-12
72. DOJ probes WSJ report that Iran used Binance to evade sanctions; Binance denies wrongdoing and sued ... - 2026-03-13
73. Trump Removes Sanctions on Russia to Help Oil Flow Amid Iran Conflict https://t.co/CXXiPATxll #shado... - 2026-03-13
74. ⚡ BREAKING: US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announces a 30-day sanctions waiver for 124 million ... - 2026-03-13
75. Senators will monitor DOJ investigation into alleged Iran sanctions evasion by crypto exchange Binan... - 2026-03-13
76. Depleted oil reserve leaves US exposed as Iran war pushes up prices - 2026-03-06
77. Oil price jumps despite deal to release record amount of reserves - 2026-03-12
78. Iran tells world to get ready for oil at $200 a barrel as it fires on merchant ships - 2026-03-11
79. Oil prices top $100 per barrel as big Middle East producers cut output amid Iran war - 2026-03-08
80. Oil prices soar past $100 a barrel as war escalates in Iran - 2026-03-08
81. US to release 172 million barrels of oil from strategic reserve to combat energy price hike - 2026-03-12
82. The longer the War lasts the Better for Clean Tech - 2026-03-12
83. IEA agrees to record release of emergency oil reserves in an effort to calm surging prices - 2026-03-11
84. US releasing 172M barrels from strategic reserve, oil around $92rn, could this cool the rally? - 2026-03-12
85. US air defenses may not be able to intercept many of Iran’s one-way drones - 2026-03-05
86. Bahrain's major oil refinery also reportedly struck by Iranian drone attack - 2026-03-09
87. Iranian drone attacks on Amazon’s Gulf data centers a harbinger of new tactics in future conflicts, experts say - 2026-03-10
88. Global Oil Market Shifts as Trump Signals Iran War May End Soon - 2026-03-10
89. IEA agrees to release 400 million barrels of oil to address Iran war supply disruption - 2026-03-11
90. Analysts Warn of Largest Oil Supply Disruption in History - 2026-03-03
91. Morning Brief: Oil Refuses to Break Below $100 — And the U.S. Is Running Out of Ways to Fix It - 2026-03-13
92. As oil prices spike, G7 opts not to dip into emergency reserves for now - 2026-03-09
93. ‘Absolutely Massive’ Price Shocks Coming as Trump’s Iran War Drives Up Gas, Diesel Prices | “What should really terrify Republicans is... the futures price on wholesale gasoline,” said economist Pa... - 2026-03-04
94. Iran's Guards challenges Trump to have US Navy escort oil tankers in Strait of Hormuz - 2026-03-06
95. White House says US Navy hasn't escorted any tankers through the Strait of Hormuz - 2026-03-11
96. After Venezuela blow, Iran supply risks test China's oil strategy - 2026-03-10